by Chris B
In this essay, in opposition to political science, we will present a new form of political analysis born from the groundbreaking work of Bertrand de Jouvenel, and we will provide an analysis of the state of political science itself using this same analytical framework to demonstrate the viability and accuracy of this approach. The background to the approach is found in the works of political theorist Jouvenel, in particular his seminal book On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth[i] in which Jouvenel developed an observation that the leveling of society was conducted as a means to furthering the ends of power centers in society. Taking this observation as his starting point, Jouvenel provided a significant quantity of case studies from across the feudal era and early modernity to make the case that centralising power in the form of the monarchs of Europe, and then subsequent republican governments, led to the development of modernity and democracy.
Extrapolating from this analysis it follows that if leveling was conducted by the actions of power centers, and was not therefore a natural process bubbling up from society spontaneously as is assumed by all current political science variants, then there is significant predictive value in this insight. Further to this, it follows that power centers in engaging in leveling as a means of conducting conflict with other power centers act as selection mechanisms for culture. This mechanism leads to society moving toward certain cultural traits which are selected not on merit or correctness, but on value to the power centers in question. These conclusions have lead to the development of the following multi-layered framework:
The level of individual actors
Attempting to formulate theories of cultural, ideological, intellectual and historical development based on aggregating ground level actors such as activists, academics, journalists, politicians, minorities, etc. is incoherent and attempts to make sense of it are misguided. These developments are a product of selection and promotion by less visible institutions. Identification of these institutions is key, and the means to do so is to identify organisers and financing behind the actors which leads to the second stage of analysis.
The level of power-institutions
The various ministries and departments of the state, private foundations, academic institutions etc., explain how movements at the lower level get organised and funded, but this stage does not yet explain why, for the actions of these institutions cannot be understood in terms of their own stated aims, but only in terms of the power-structure in which they are embedded. This leads us to the final stage.
The political system
The constitutional and legal structure of the state, as it actually functions rather than as it is supposed to function, explains why the state’s constituent institutions (both putatively public and private) have been set against one another in intractable covert warfare. Here we find the explanation for why the power-institutions employ such bizarre means in their battles with one another, including the various strategies Jouvenel outlined.
Power analysis in this framework has significant explanatory power, and is extremely capable of providing confirmable predictions. An excellent case study is supplied by the continual dominance of political science in its current guise. This has occurred despite its inherent failure to provide an explanation for anything, or even the promise of a solid analysis of society.
An application of power analysis to political science.
Beginning the first level of analysis, we can disregard any theoretical model which attempts to explain the existence of political science as being a result of the spontaneous interplay of individuals. With this we reject the obviously assumed mechanism of selection based on correctness. The first order of business is to then analyse the actors within political science and establish where their funding and organisation came/ comes from.
Doing this, we can see that it is an open secret that political science has been shaped by tax exempt foundations and federal governance decisions. The APSA (American Political Science Association) which would form the center of political science originated as an Anglo-American forum for discussing political theory, with the proceedings from the first annual meeting revealing an unclear idea of political science[ii], but it is not until the chairmanship of Charles Merriam that the direction of political science was set on the course which we see today with the creation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC.)[iii] It is a matter of record that the funding that allowed Merriam to do so was provided by a cross network of private funding through the major philanthropic foundations as noted in the Rockefeller archives entry for the SSRC, which reveals:
To support its work, the SSRC turned not to the U.S. government, whose support seemed more appropriate for the natural sciences, but to private foundations. For the first fifty years, well over three-quarters of the SSRC’s funding was provided by the Russell Sage Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and two Rockefeller philanthropies, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation. By the 1970s, however, funds for some special projects were obtained from federal agencies.[iv]
The wording on this entry incorrectly supplies the impression that the SSRC was created independently, then sought funding, something which makes no sense. It was the other way around. This same funding source was responsible for all of the major political science institutes and trends which occurred in the Anglo-American world, with the foundation of such institutions as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in the United States and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA also known as Chatham House) in the United Kingdom.[v] Funding came from the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation to name but a few.[vi] The Ford Foundation in particular would prove the main catalyst post World War II, as Joan Roelofs notes in Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism:
Somit and Tanenhaus estimate that during the 1950s and 1960s:
[T]he Ford complex provided 90 percent of the money channelled to political science by American philanthropic institutions. Under these circumstance, political scientists would have been less than human were they not tempted to manifest a deep interest in the kinds of research known to be favoured by Ford Foundations staff and advisers.[vii]
The result of this initial funding from the likes of the Ford Foundations was to place a pre-decided positivistic political science firmly in the driving seat in Anglo-American academia despite it being pretty much baseless, with the work and influence of Charles Merriam in particular being dominant. Merriam even became a trustee of the Lucy Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund through which his influence was direct both intellectually and financially.[viii] Post- Merriam this has not altered in the least, and at every turn foundation money is directed toward positivistic political science.
A closer look at specific variants of political science will reveal this mechanism of foundation funding (and funding itself) being the key driver of theory development and success, regardless of inherent correctness. For the purposes of this paper, we will look at both the rise of behaviourism, and also the case of international relations from which we can learn important lessons. Both areas are clearly the result of the proactive actions of foundations, which is to really say, the proactive actions of an elite stratum of American society in control of foundation funds. These foundations and their trustees did not act in isolation and without communication with the rest of the governing elite of society, to assume that this is the case is illogical.
The rise of International Relations
In The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory[ix] editor Nicolas Guilhot observes the following in his introduction:
Once again, intellectual histories tend to produce a coherence that is then transformed into a property of the corpus of intellectual productions under scrutiny, the field being then seen as a rational “dialogue” or “conversation” between different works or authors – but they often fail to gauge the extent to which such a conversation may be staged, when “staging conversations” falls precisely within the line of business and the discrete power of philanthropic foundations funding various academic ventures. Turning the spotlights from the disciplinary stage to the backstage logistics suddenly makes visible the work of identification, classification, and promotion that is involved in the constitution of disciplinary canons.[x]
With the example of international relations theory, the logistics of the canon of works can only be explained adequately by the actions of foundation funding. In fact, as the same author notes later in his introduction that “Ultimately, we may learn as much about the history of IR from such garbled discussions as the 1954 conference as from reading the “classical” works in the discipline.”[xi] This “identification, classification, and promotion” of text and thinkers is precisely what makes and shape areas of thought, and it is clear from even a cursory search of the main actors within the IR area that they are all funded and maintained by grants from foundations or the federal government, either directly, or indirectly.
Taking a name out of a hat, metaphorically speaking, we can look at the distinguished CV of Robert Keohane, Professor of International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University[xii] and we can assess the level of significance the logistics of foundation funding has had on his very existence as an academic in international relations.
Looking at fellowships, we can see below which institutions were created or maintained by foundation funding:
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1977-1978; 1987-1988; 2004-05. (Founded by the Ford Foundation)[xiii]
Guggenheim Fellowship, 1992-93. (Founded by the The John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation)[xiv]
Bellagio Resident Fellowship, 1993. (Founded by the Rockefeller Foundation)[xv]
National Endowment for the Humanities, Frank Kenan Fellow, 1995-96. (Funded from various foundations and educational institutes)[xvi]
Visitor, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., 2008-09. (Receives significant funding from a number of foundations including the Ford Foundation)[xvii]
Social Science Research Council, Senior Foreign Policy Fellowship, September 1987, August 1988. (Founded by Charles Merriam with the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Foundation.)[xviii]
German Marshall Fund Research Fellowship, 1977-1978. (Funded by numerous foundations and institutions)[xix]
Council on Foreign Relations, International Affairs Fellowship, 1968-1969. (Founded and funded by numerous Foundations since its inception)[xx]
Moving onto to Selected Professional Service:
American Political Science Association, President, 1999-2000. Council, 1971-1973; Woodrow Wilson Award Committee, 1982; Nominating Committee, 1990-91 (Chair, 1990); Chair, Minority Identification Project,1990-92; Member, Committee on Graduate Studies, 2004; Chair APSR Editorial Search Committee, 2005-06. International Studies Association: President, 1988-1989; Chair, Nominations Committee, 1985. (Funded by various foundations)[xxi]
Department of Political Science, Stanford University: Chair, 1980-81.
Department of Government, Harvard University: Chair, 1988-92. International Organization: Board of Editors, 1968-1977, 1982-88; 1992-97, 1998-2004. Editor, 1974-1980; Chair, Board of Editors, 1986-87.
National Science Foundation, member of Political Science Panel, c. 1977-79. (Federal founding)[xxii]
National Academy of Sciences, “America’s Climate Choices” Committee, panel on limiting emissions, 2009-10. (Federal founding)[xxiii]
I have neither the time nor the resources (barring a Foundation granting me such) to pursue all of the records of Robert Keohane’s income from universities specifically, and whether they too were supplemented/ sourced from foundations, so the above simple analysis will likely massively understate the role of foundation money on his academic career and influence.
This state of affairs will be the same for all major figures in the International relations field across all variants, as there is no other way it could not be. There are simply no independent benefactors of any real size, and no real scope for self-sufficient thinkers on any great scale. As such, we should be considering the formal effect of simple funding on cultural and intellectual development as definitive.
The rise of behaviouralism
In addition to the foundation led creation of the discipline of international relations, we also have the case of behaviouralism which is practically an indistinguishable discipline.
In 1947, Henry Ford II directed Rowan Gaither to produce a report outlining what the Ford Foundation should direct their funding towards. The report was published in 1949 following exhaustive consultation with the academic establishments of the USA with the title Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program.[xxiv] The conclusion of this study was that funding should concentrate on the following programs:
Program Area One deals with the conditions of peace essential to democratic progress. Program Area Three is concerned with the economic bases of democracy, Program Area Four with its educational foundations, and Program Area Five with the conditions of personal life requisite for democratic self-realization.[xxv]
Program Area Two meanwhile is simply “The strengthening of democracy.”[xxvi]
This fifth category in the above quote is not quite clear however its chapter title of “individual Behavior and Human Relations”[xxvii] should make it more so. Category five is the incipient area of behaviourism and modern political science. Indeed, one only has to read the Gaither report to see the language of behaviourism before its rise:
Theories now exist which promise to lead to more complete understanding of the mainsprings of human action and, even more fortunately, we now have certain techniques for the testing of these theories. Moreover, we have in the social sciences scientifically minded research workers who are both interested in, and equipped for, the use of such techniques. Among these are the psychologists, sociologist, and anthropologist.[xxviii]
Noting this direct link between Behaviourism’s rise and the Ford Foundation is not something unique to this paper, but is actually something of an open secret. Erkki Berndtson[xxix] in a wide ranging essay on the subject notes that:
Many have even argued that the whole concept of behavioralism came into use only because of the policy of foundations (Geiger 1988: 329). And Bernard Berelson seems to agree:
“What happened to give rise to the term? The key event was the development of a Ford Foundation program in this field. The program was initially designated ‘individual behavior and human relations’ but it soon became known as the behavioral sciences program and, indeed, was officially called that within the foundation. It was the foundation’s administrative action, then, that led directly to the term and to the concept of this particular field of study.” (Berelson 1968: 42)”
The foundation money created also a self-generating process which led to the recruitment of behavioralists. Because behavioralist projects were funded better than traditional ones, there were a larger supply of behavioralists up for recruitment than others (Hacker 1959: 39-40). It is no wonder that some of the key practioners of behavioralism have been willing to admit, that “it was almost single-handedly the Ford Foundation that did so much to legitimate empirical social science” (Warren E. Miller in Baer, et al., eds. 1991: 242).[xxx]
Berelson, for the record, was the director of the Behavioural Sciences Program of the Ford program from 1951 to 1957.[xxxi]
The upshot of this state of affairs is that it is clear that the selection mechanisms for theories within academia in relation to political science are neither accuracy nor the explanatory capability of the theory in question This rules out any spontaneous development theory of the development of political science. Instead, the foundations set a course for a putatively objective, progressive, and scientific political science which no matter how many times it fails, does not lose funding and becomes self reinforcing. Any competing claim or analysis on the other hand finds itself sowing seeds on barren ground. It became, and remains, a self-reinforcing discipline.
The political system
Having progressed from the individual level to the power institution level, the next question to face is that of why the foundations and institutes propagated and continue to propagate this specific course of theorising. To do this, we need to address the political structure within which these institutions exist, this is to say, to address the republican structure of society.
A republican structure is one in which governance is subject to various checks and balances as a means to ensure that the behaviour of governance is responsible and limited. However the result of republican governance is the exact opposite of these aims because of this structure.
Another factor inherent in republican structures is the passive, or rather, reflexive nature of the governmental structure, which ultimately requires matters become legal matters to achieve final incorporation into the “rule of law.”
Given this analysis, we would likely see that governing elites wishing to act in a proactive manner in a republican democratic structure which formally precludes this form of behaviour will engage in the following behaviour as outlined by Jouvenel’s theory:
- Promotion of equality and cultural trends at the expense of intermediary power centers to circumvent hurdles to action.
- Utilisation of putative “non-governmental” resources to achieve goals, and undermine intermediary centers of power.
- Attempt to raise the actions aimed at, and contained in, point (1) and (2) to legal issues to incorporate them into “rule of law” through legal action, making the actions legitimate within the framework of republican governance.
- Promotion of any cultural trends and ideas which promote republican governance overall.
The question then becomes – what does this have to do with political science? The answer unsurprisingly is that the specific ideas of empirical and positivist understanding of governance contained in political science promoted by foundations accord with liberal theories of governance, in which society can be run through formula or through mechanisms such as “rule of law.” This understanding of society is also one premised on society being an agglomeration of individual desires and wants to which the liberal state acts as a protective umpire. This is fundamentally liberalism at root. These theories also promote a scientism which has been a hallmark of liberal politics used as a weapon against recalcitrant sections of society. The spread of positivistic social science and liberal democracy, as well as republicanism, move hand in hand at all times.
Foundations are, and have been since the start, manned by the elite within society, who had, and have, strong links with formally recognised government actors and on many occasions were jointly formally recognised government actors. It is questionable whether they should really be considered as private endeavours at all and instead should be considered informal government actors. This renders the creation of all mainstream political science by foundations (run by the liberal elite) a case of creation according to a mix of a priori ideologically deduced demands, and politically induced aggression (the electoral cycle, republican blocks and any other elements of the formal governance structure that are not viewed as progressive.)
The subsequent decisions of these actors to follow specific assumptions without any particular proof that they were correct at all beckons us to place their assumptions within their overall cultural environment, which is itself a product of the structural reality of the political system of republican democracy. This realisation that political science is a mere sub set of progressive assumptions is again echoed in Berndst’s essay on behavioralism with the referencing of the British critic of positivistic social science Bernard Crick. As Berndst writes:
Scientific culture is tied to many ways to the general social, economic and political culture and development of a given country. Bernard Crick’s thesis that American political science is based on a four-fold relationship between a common notion of science, the idea of a citizenhip training, the habits of democracy and a common belief in an inevitable progress (Crick 1959: xv) still merits attention.[xxxii]
Or as James Farr notes in an article on “The History of Political Science”:
“Crick thought that political science, at least in America, harboured some definite political beliefs of a distinctly liberal sort and that writing a history of political science according to scientific criteria simply recapitulated those liberal beliefs. He argued quite plainly that “the classification [of the development of political science] according to methodology is itself the expression of some substantive political beliefs, characteristic of American political thought””[xxxiii]
And that “”the idea of a science of politics” showed itself to be but a “caricature of American liberal democracy.””[xxxiv] To make this point even stronger, we can return to the Geither report and excerpt a number of passages to make it clear that, in effect, the driving impetus for the creation of political science was democratic advocacy. The report declares that “the committee’s conception of human welfare is stated in Chapter I[…] is in large measure synonymous with a definition of democratic ideals.”[xxxv] Further:
the committee believes that these problems may be attacked and human welfare furthered by programs in the areas recommended in Chapter III: the establishment of peace, the strengthening of democracy, the strengthening of the economy, the improvement of education, and the better understanding of man[xxxvi]
the committee’s analysis in Chapter II of the critical problems of our contemporary society makes clear the great need for knowledge of the principles which govern human behaviour in political, economic, and other group activities, and in the individuals’ personal life…At the same time individuals require an understanding of human behaviour, their own as well as that of others, if they are to help maintain the democratic nature of such planning and control, and if they are to make adequate personal adjustment to the conflicting and changing demands of modern living.[xxxvii]
So we can see program area five (which again, was to become behavioralism and modern political science) was driven by the aim of improving human welfare, human welfare itself being synonymous with democracy to the elites funding political science. The question then arises as to what would happen if this “science” found results that conflicted with democratic assumptions, but then this question is rendered null and void by the very fact that it carries the assumptions of democracy (which are clearly synonymous with liberal political theory) with it. Its conclusions were decided before it began. The mainspring of these conclusions can be found expressed on page 17:
Basic to human welfare is the idea of the dignity of man – the conviction that man must be regarded as an end in himself, not as a mere cog in the mechanisms of society. At heart, this is a belief in the inherent worth of the individual, in the intrinsic value of human life[xxxviii]
This is again repeated on pages 46-47 of the report:
Democracy accepts the fact of conflicting interests and even encourages the positive expression of divergent views, aims, and values. Democratic theory assumes, however, that conflicts can be resolved or accommodated by nonviolent means, and that discrimination and hostility between groups on the basis of race, national origin, or religion can be kept below the point where the basic well-being of society is threatened. In a most realistic and practical manner, intergroup hostilities weaken our democratic strength by dissipating important resources of energy in internal conflicts, and by swelling the ranks of malcontents who constitutes the seed bed for undemocratic ideologies.
Considerations such as these lead to the conclusion that man now stands uncertain and confused at a critical point in world history. He must choose between two opposed courses. One is democratic, dedicated to the freedom and dignity of the individuals, as an end in himself. The other, the antithesis of democracy, is authoritarian, wherein freedom and justice do not exist, and human rights and truth are wholly subordinated to the state.[xxxix]
Not just category five, but all categories mentioned in the report are devoted to democracy. Not society, but a democratic society. They are all highly politicised by default, and a result of the political structure which they clearly serve. They all not only assume an individual in accordance with the anthropology of liberalism but actively promote the concept.
The ramifications of this are that this program that became behavioralism, political science etc. is anything but objective, but is in fact loaded with liberal theories concerning anthropology which are either overt or basically just assumed without thought. These assumptions include the belief that the human is pre-societal, possessed of set preferences that are subject to societal negotiation, and that individuals are a natural state of mankind, despite the stunning ahistorical nature of this assumption. Democracy and liberal theory then goes from being the temporal, geographical and contingent state of affairs that it is, to being the basis of “science” in the form of political science.
The liberal source of political science
In summary, having applied power analysis to the field of political science, we can conclude that its shape, its priorities and its continuation are the result of funding institution’s activities. The motives of the institutions providing the funding are themselves only comprehensible by reference to the political structure within which they reside and their relative positions in that structure. The structure in question is the liberal democratic state structure which ingrains a liberal theory of politics and society in which society is comprised of individual actors that collectively constitute society from the ground up. From this understanding which is central to liberalism and the modern state, we have a number of assumptions which political science encapsulates:
- The totality of society is determinable from an empirical study of the preferences and behaviours of individuals within society.
- These individuals have a predetermined and fixed set of preferences which are pre-societal.
- A fact/value distinction.
- That according to point one, two and three, Democracy is a scientifically groundable concept.
These conceptions amount to the assertion that political structures are developed from the ground up, and that an objective comprehension of this mechanism is possible to deduce that is not influenced from above. Contrary to this, the evidence shows that all of these concepts and all concepts within political science are thoroughly rooted in time, place and power configuration context. Referring back to basic liberal theory, we find that all of these conceptions and assumptions are present, thus demonstrating the genealogy of this concept beyond the point of the foundations.
Beginning with the idea that the totality of society is divinable from the preferences of individuals, this is distinctly Hobbesian and Lockean. One could say this is a central point of liberal thought and the institutions which have promoted this thinking since the 16th century. If we return back to the beginning of the intellectual formulation of liberalism, it is observable that it is a process of taking individual actors as given individuals anterior to society. From social contract theory to the state of nature, all of this theory is premised on trying to deduce why these pre-societal individuals form governments. Why these institutions and thinkers did this at the origin of liberalism itself appears to be a result of conflict between power centers at the time[xl]. There is more to say on this topic, but for now it suffices to observe that the individual as anterior to society is a liberal conception, from which political science derives its fundamental assumptions.
Further to this assertion of the pre-societal nature of the individual, we have the fact/value distinction which is rendered incoherent without the underpinning of set, pre-societal preferences and desires. The underlying structure of the fact/value distinction is basically liberalism, which is again, a historically, geographically and structurally contingent development.
Taking all of these basically liberal conceptions together, we can then begin to talk about a science of politics which can be developed from analysing the actions of the individuals that comprise society. We can therefore see behaviouralism and political science are merely liberalism in a thin disguise of science.
In summary, again, what we can see given a review of the logistics of political science is that it is not explainable as a spontaneous development that has won over thinkers by it successful ability to explain political events. This is not a tenable claim. Political Science in its modern guise was brought into being by funds from philanthropic institutions with a clear liberal underpinning. The smooth transition to federal and university funding once the institutionalising of this liberal science was complete should not be a surprise given the overlap between foundations and the governing and educational elite.
The motives and drives for this funding into existence of political science is subsequently the key question, and this is explainable in accordance with the Jouvenelian observation that power centers within a divided governmental system will engage in centralising conflict with one another by indirect means. The example of Rowan Gaither serves as perfect expression of this. A reader unfamiliar with Gaither may look for the Gaither report, and become confused by the presence of two reports referred to by this name. The first is the previously mentioned Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program,[xli] whilst the second is Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age[xlii] produced for, and presented to, President Eisenhower. Conventional wisdom implicitly asserts that these two reports produced for two separate institutions must be non-related. As if Gaither would write and work for the USA’s official governance institutions then walk out of the door, become a neutral actor, then walk through the door of the Ford Foundation and operate as an independent actor. This is a totally unreasonable assumption, but it is a basic foundation of political understanding in republican governance that there is a sharp distinction between the categories of a private sphere and a governmental sphere. This assumption is so ingrained that Gaither himself also refers to himself and foundations as neutral, impartial, and apolitical whilst discussing influencing politics.
An alternative and far more reasonable assumption to make would be that the governing web of elites would work irrespective of the formal institutions that define the republic structure, using such centers as the Ford Foundation as tools just as much as the Presidential Office or Senate. I see no reason to consider the Ford Foundation or any other institution as an entity independent of governance as it (and Gaither) claims.
This pattern holds throughout all of the putative non-governmental institutions cited in this essay, with the egregious examples of the actions of those setting up the RIIA and the CFR standing out. I have made a point of providing reference and documentation directly from the institutions in questions so as avoid any questions as to the sources, given the nature of the claims in this essay.
In effect, the formation and direction of political science is accurately predicted using the model outlined in this article. Any political “science” which cannot rise to the challenge of refuting this is not worthy of the name.
[i] Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth (New York, Viking Press, 1949.) For further analysis of the relevance of Jouvenel, see the further essays in this journal edition: “The Patron Theory of Politics,” and “The Patron Theory of Politics Revisited: Religion and Conflict.”
[ii] See Frank J.Goodnow, “The Work of The American Political Science Association,” Proceeding of the American Political Science Association, Vol. 1 (1904): p 35-46.
[iii] Kenton W. Worcester, Social Science Research Council, 1923-1998 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 2001.)
[iv] Rockefeller Archive Center, Social Science Research Council Archives, 1924-1990, accessed March 12, 2017, http://rockarch.org/collections/nonrockorgs/ssrc.php.
[v] For details on the various funding sources for the RIIA see Carol Quigley. The Anglo-American Establishment (New York, Books in Focus, 1981) Chapter 10- The Royal Institute of International Affairs. For details of the various funding sources for the CFR and its origination from “The Inquiry” created by Woodrow Wilson, also see Quigley. In addition, see Peter Grosse. Continuing the Inquiry (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996) for the financing provided by foundations and members of international finance.
[vii] Joan Roelofs. Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism (State University of New York Press, 2003) P 42.
[viii] 100 years The Rockefeller Foundation, Social Science Research Council exhibit page, accessed March 12, 2017, http://rockefeller100.org/exhibits/show/social_sciences/social-science-research-counci.
[ix] Nicolas Guilhot. The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011.)
[x] Ibid, pp 14-15.
[xi] Ibid, p 15.
[xv] “The Bellagio Center Residency Program”, accessed March 13, 2017, https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/bellagio-center/residency-program/.
[xvii] “How is research at the Institute funded?,” IAS frequently asked questions, accessed March 13, 2017, https://www.ias.edu/about/faqs. Also, note a significant grant of £1.5 million in 1969 to the IAS to create a school of social science, with a further 2 million obtained from other sources as yet unclear – most likely other foundations. See: “Research and Training Support” PS, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer, 1969), pp. 401-06.
[xviii] Rockefeller Archive Center, Social Science Research Council Archives, 1924-1990, accessed March 12, 2017, http://rockarch.org/collections/nonrockorgs/ssrc.php.
[xx] Peter Grosse. Continuing the Inquiry (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press,1996.)
[xxi] A full review of the funding history of the APSA is not feasible for this article, it suffices to note the links between APSA and the major foundations in relation to the creation of the Social Science Research Council Archives.
[xxiv] Published by the Ford Foundation. Report of the study for the Ford Foundation on policy and program [prepared by the Study Committee] (Detroit, 1949.)
[xxv] Ibid, p 63.
[xxvi] Ibid, p 70.
[xxvii] Ibid, p 90.
[xxviii] Ibid, p 92.
[xxix] Erkki Berndtson. “Behavioralism: Origins of the Concept”( Prepared for Presentation at the XVIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association August 17-21, 1997 Seoul, Korea.)
[xxxi] For internal reference to the central part played by Berelson, see The Ford Foundation Behavioural Sciences Division Report dated 1953, which also provides details regarding the funding activities of the Foundation in relation to Program Five of the Report of the study for the Ford Foundation on policy and program [prepared by the Study Committee]. A copy is obtainable from http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=50995 accessed March 12, 2017.
[xxxii] Erkki Berndtson. “Behavioralism: Origins of the Concept”( Prepared for Presentation at the XVIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association August 17-21, 1997 Seoul, Korea.)
[xxxiii] James Farr. “The History of Political Science,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), P 1179.
[xxxiv] Ibid, p 1176.
[xxxv] Published by the Ford Foundation. Report of the study for the Ford Foundation on policy and program [prepared by the Study Committee] (Detroit, 1949) p 12-13.
[xxxvi] Ibid, p 14-15.
[xxxvii] Ibid, p 90.
[xxxviii] Ibid, p17.
[xxxix] Ibid, pp 46-47.
[xl] See the further papers “The Patron Theory of Politics,” and “The Patron Theory of Politics Revisited: Religion and Conflict” for arguments regarding the role of institutional conflicts in the development of liberalism.
[xli] Published by the Ford Foundation. Report of the study for the Ford Foundation on policy and program [prepared by the Study Committee] (Detroit, 1949.)
[xlii] Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age (The “Gaither Report” of 1957,)(US Government Printing Office , Washington, 1957.)